Combined value auctions (CVAs) allow participants to make an offer of a single amount for a collection of items. These auctions provide value to both buyers and sellers of goods or services in a number of environments, but they have rarely been implemented,
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Background
Historically SLS contracted for trucking services through a series of bilateral negotiations. A large group of SLS agents worked with many carriers to negotiate services on individual lanes (single transportation paths, for example, from Chicago to Los Angeles) or groups of lanes. For a large enterprise like Sears, this negotiation process was time consuming and expensive.
In the early 1990s, SLS sought to lower its truckload carrier costs by consolidating its acquisition of trucking services so that truckload carriers could better deploy their assets and share the savings with SLS. SLS put together a strategy that, it believed, would save logistics costs and would encourage carriers to participate in the consolidation process.
SLS had begun to experiment with procurement auctions. By allowing carriers to offer it simple single classes of transportation services through single-round sealed-bid singlelane auctions, it was saving on costs. The idea was to extend this approach to the larger consolidation effort. SLS and JSCO recognized that the trucking firms might rebel if SLS put up a sizable piece of their regular and profitable business for competitive auction. Some of the more reliable firms might even refuse to participate, and therefore, the next auction might not have enough capacity to serve the needs of SLS.
JSCO identified a small number of partners that could be given exclusive rights to bid in the auction and who would be helped in their planning and participation. By limiting the number of partners, SLS provided an incentive for participation, the opportunity to obtain the business. Using a complex proprietary procedure, JSCO and SLS qualified the carriers to insure that SLS could be confident it could rely on the carriers selected. This 5 also reassured the invited partners that other participants were peers able to provide a similar level of service. In the end, 14 national and regional carriers qualified and participated. SLS informed the candidates of the names of the competitors that qualified.
In 1992 it was not known precisely how to organize an auction of this magnitude.
What was to be auctioned? That is, what would it mean if a carrier won? Would it have to deliver anything Sears requested for the term of the contract? Would it have to handle only a fixed maximum weekly set of loads, leaving SLS to find others to handle excess shipments? JSCO provided the answers to these questions. Should SLS auction one lane Two innovations offered the promise of better asset deployment, which could result in shared savings for the carrier and SLS if implemented through a properly designed auction:
(1) Letting three-year contracts that included surge demand contingencies; and (2) Letting contracts on a large number of lanes simultaneously through a process that solicited single offers for multiple lanes, thereby allowing carriers to coordinate SLS business with other business, and reduce related empty or low value backhaul movements.
A standard one-sided procurement auction, increasingly referred to as a reverse auction, was the process of choice for implementing the first innovation. To 6 implement the second, one must use a combined-value procurement auction. In a combined-value auction (CVA), carriers can put together orders that comprise multiple items and make offers that express their combined value for the group rather than cobbling together individual trades and facing the risk that they will miss links in a desired chain.
Combined Value Design
If the carriers were to create the saving for themselves, thus creating value to share with SLS, SLS would have to assure them of steady, nearly risk-free business and they would need to coordinate their bids across multiple lanes. To assure the carriers, SLS decided to auction three-year contracts with contingencies for surge and slack demand.
Allowing carriers to coordinate their bids was more difficult. To use their assets efficiently, by reducing the number of miles trucks travel empty, carriers must solve a fairly complex minimization problem. The carrier must coordinate SLS shipments and shipments they expect to have under contract to others on lanes SLS may not even be auctioning. What a firm is willing to supply services for on a specific Chicago to Los Angeles lane depends critically on what it has committed in the LA to Chicago direction (which may itself involve multiple lanes). If an SLS lane (say St. Louis to Chicago) is part of that return cartage then the amount the trucking firm is willing to accept for the Chicago to LA lane depends on how much it will be paid for the St. Louis to Chicago lane. That is, the amount it is willing to accept to do both the Chicago to LA and the St.
Louis to Chicago lanes depends on the combined value, which will generally be less than the sum of the individual part (Appendix).
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The problem was to design an auction that would reveal and take advantage of these combined-value opportunities. At that time we did not know of any auctions being used that allowed combined-value bidding. However, research using laboratory experiments, described by Banks, Ledyard, and Porter [1989] , had demonstrated the potential power of combined-value bidding over traditional methods. Combined-value auctions differ primarily in one aspect from traditional auctions. They allow participants to make a bid of a single amount for a collection of items. In the SLS case, a carrier would be able to say "I ask $1 million for the Chicago to Los Angeles land and the St.
Louis to Chicago lane" meaning "I am willing to service the two lanes for a fee of at least $1 million if and only if I can service both lanes." Once this new type of procurement bid is considered, the rest of the design follows. First, SLS auctioneers determine the winners by accepting the bids that minimize the total cost of procuring the services when it allows only one carrier per lane. Second, SLS will pay all winning bidders their asking prices. Suppose there are three bids for lanes A and B: bid one is $10 for lane A, bid two is $35 for lane B, and bid three is $40 for both lanes A and B. Bid three is the winning bid, and that bidder will be paid $40, since the $40 of bid three is less than the $45 combined bids of bidders one and two (Appendix).
A critical, if seemingly innocuous, part of the auction design is the stopping rule.
The stopping rule for an auction is absolutely crucial to its performance, both in the final cost of acquisition and in the time to completion, because it affects the incentives and the information of the bidders. One option is to let all bidders submit as many bids as they wish, up to a specified time. At that time, winners are determined and the auction is over. This is a sealed-bid procurement auction using combined-value bids. The sealed-bid 8 auction presents problems because it requires bidders to consider all contingencies and to evaluate all of the business implications of winning each subset of lanes. It also encourages submission of all possible bids by all bidders, and it has been shown to result in a higher final cost of procurement. Previous experimental results (Banks, Ledyard, and Porter 1989; McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith [1993] ) had shown that allowing the bidders to update their bids would improve the allocation. In complex environments, past experience has shown that iterations with some sort of commitment are needed to stabilize response and to speed convergence. Iterations allow feedback, reaction, and learning about the possibilities.
Iterative auctions (also called progressive auctions) have proven to be highly efficient and easy to understand and have been successfully applied in a number of settings. An English auction is an example of an iterative auction. In an English auction, bidders submit bids verbally to an auctioneer. The first bidder's bid becomes the standing bid that other bidders must beat to establish a new standing bid or to win the item. The auction continues until no one is willing to submit a higher bid than the standing bid. The winner is the bidder with the last standing bid (that is, the highest bid submitted). In this auction, the winner pays a price equal to its winning bid.
Comparisons of sealed-bid auctions and English auctions reported by Coppinger, Smith, and Titus [1980; reprinted by Smith 1991] and by Cox, Roberson, and Smith [1982;  reprinted by Smith 1991] show that the English auction is more efficient than the sealedbid auction. (Kagel and Roth, [1995] , Chapter 7 provide a comprehensive survey.) The principal advantages of the progressive auction are that the optimal bidding strategy is transparent and that the successive bids are known to all. Bidders do not need to be 9 publicly identified, which makes collusion difficult. (Smith [2000] and DeMartini et al.
[1999] discuss the advantages and disadvantages of CVA iterative auctions.)
The design team from SLS, JSCO, and NEX chose an iterative version of the sealed-bid procurement auction, in which bidding proceeded in rounds. At the end of each round, the auctioneer announced provisional winners. Going into the next round, the auctioneer held all of the provisional winning bids from the previous round, and carriers submitted new bids against that set. This requirement is extremely important because it imposes a commitment on the bidders, each bid can be viewed as a contract proposal to which the bidder will adhere if the auctioneer accepts it. Allowing bidders to withdraw provisional winning bids extends the auction and creates bad incentive.
Without such commitment, bidders face no penalty from, say, bidding randomly or from bidding to attack an opponent. Laboratory test runs had revealed that this iterative process increased cost savings over those because it allowed the firms to concentrate their efforts on those lanes that gave them a cost advantage. The stopping rule used was of this form; if total acquisition cost did not decline by at least x percent from the previous round, then the just-completed round is declared to have been the final round.
Selling Combined Value to SLS
The first step was to demonstrate to SLS that running such an auction was feasible. Ffor the record, its senior management team had a recent history of imaginative approaches to multiple logistics solutions, but was insistent on constructive demonstrations of "new approaches" to service contracting. NEX created a test bed environment and then ran combined-value auctions in that scaled-down world in the Caltech Economics Laboratory. In this case, a test bed is a scaled-down version of the items to be auctioned and the incentive structure of the participants. Using such an environment is similar to using scale models and wind tunnels in automotive and aircraft design. The SLS team readily subscribed to this concept.. JSCO, working with SLS participants, provided a model of a truckload transportation network with approximately correct representations of loads, unit costs, and lane profitabilities (Appendix).
The experimental test bed operated over a local area network of computers in the Caltech Economics Laboratory. Undergraduate students at Caltech were recruited, all of whom had experience in other market experiments. They acted as trucking firms in the auction and earned money based on their decisions. They earned money by winning bids on lanes for amounts above their costs, which we gave them (Appendix). For example, if the cost of providing service on lane AB was 300 cents and a student won the auction with a bid of 350 cents for lane AB, he or she earned 50 cents. On average, students earned $30 to $40 for a two-hour session. The experiments also tested the optimization program in real time; we were able to correct errors that had escaped the debugging process.
In the meantime, the NEX team scaled up the auction part of the testbed so that it could handle over 1000 lanes. This potentially huge, combinatoric problem is daunting (even with today's technology), but it was almost overwhelming in 1993. In theory, each bidder could submit a huge number (2 raised to the 854 th power) of bids, possibly more than the number of stars in the universe. Practical factors, however, limited the number of bids submitted. In particular, in the actual auction, bidders submitted bids via spreadsheets on floppy disks. At the time, these spreadsheets limited what a bidder could do. The maximum number of bids submitted was 4,595; and bidders did not complain that they could not submit enough bids. Starting from standard algorithms with some front-end sorting and culling of orders, we created an algorithm that easily handled problems of this scope. The algorithm had no trouble finding the optimal solution in less than an hour. (Using today's computers, that would be less than a minute.)
Once we had designed an acceptable CVA, we had to explain it to the SLS team and get its approval. The experimental test bed was an important demonstration tool.
We took the test bed to SLS so the team members could participate in a CVA. The goal of the demonstration was to show them that trucking firms could understand the auction procedures and that SLS would incur savings. The demonstration convinced the SLS team that a CVA was workable.
The final step was to take this test bed to the trucking firms. It served as a sales device to interest them in participating in the ultimate auction and as a training device to teach teams how to participate successfully. JSCO used materials developed in the laboratory to do most of the sales and training with the firms that had been prequalified.
In 1993, the sales and training processes were time intensive. Today, creative use of the Web and interactive software could easily cut the time needed for training. In similar environments, explaining such processes takes less than an hour. Ultimately, the firms accepted the CVA as a new way of doing business.
The First Auction Results
SLS initially committed to a single auction. The auction ran for five rounds with about one month between rounds. (Table 1) Include Table 1 here In 50 percent of the bids, bidders used the multilane-bid capability of the combined value auction, and 30 percent of the package bids submitted in the last round were winners, indicating the usefulness of this feature. In addition, contrary to some people's expectations that combinatoric calculations would be a problem, our software took only 15 to 30 minutes to calculate winning bids.
In observing the bidding behavior, we found that many bidders wanted to submit bids of the following form: "I will supply lanes A, B, and C for $100 or supply lanes D, E, and F for $120 but not both." Although this feature, called XOR, is now standard in combined-value auctions, the SLS auction did not allow such bids. Nevertheless, the bidders found a clever way to make such bids. They would submit two overlapping bids, including a small, inexpensive lane, say, G, in both: "I bid $101 for A, B, C, and G," and "I bid $121 for D, E, F, and G." Both bids couldn't' win. However, this tactic had the unintended result of raising the cost of supplying lane G.
SLS contacted all the participants two to three weeks after it distributed the final results requesting observations on both the process and outcome. The carriers overall reaction to this type of auction was favorable. They were happy to execute the outcome and to participate in future auctions of the same format. Carriers found that the redistribution did not negatively affect the volume of business they were carrying, nor did market participants trash the rates. Carriers met the business requirements of the traffic awarded and still made an acceptable margin on the business. They particularly liked the format and the level of detail in the traffic information provided. They stated that they were reasonable happy with their outcomes. Each carrier had lost one or two lanes that 13 they would have likes to retain, but they recognized the loss as a reality of the business and the process.
Most of the negative issues concerned execution of the auction. Most bidders thought the auction should have gone fewer rounds, and that the process took too long.
Carriers differed as to whether they had enough time to respond. Some looked at every lane in every round and wanted more time (the national carriers). Others focused on fewer lanes in their bidding and would have been happy with less turnaround time. The carriers differed in their level of sophistication in analysis. Some used detailed modeling, while others worked out their strategies using pencil and paper.
One bidders thought that the process was purely price driven but shouldn't have been. They felt that SLS gave no consideration to the service capabilities of the carriers and that incumbents on particular lanes had no advantage. However, SLS considered service and performance capabilities during the participant-selection process. It had considered incumbency benefits and thought they would realistically be implicit because incumbent carriers would have been able to develop supporting business to support those lanes during their tenure.
The Market Test
Following the success of this first SLS procurement auction, SLS bought software and hardware from NEX with the capability of running similar auctions. With the help of JSCO, SLS ran five auctions during 1995 and 1996 (Table 2 ).
14 Include SLS adopted CVAs for procuring transportation services and still uses them today, with the full support of management.
Conclusion: Lessons Learned
The key measure of success for any new auction design is whether it is used. The CVA implemented by SLS has been a success. It has been a success in other regards also. As designers of economic systems, we learned a considerable amount about designing and implementing complex auctions and markets. Of the many things we learned, one was the importance of including an XOR bid (I want A or B but not both) in the auction. The XOR bid allows bidders to specify a larger range of preferences in a single round of
bidding. An important feature of the auction was the prequalification of participants. It ensured informed and serious bidding. Finally, bidders complained about the length of time the overall process took. The same issues arose in the design and operation of the 15 FCC auctions of the electromagnetic spectrum. In retrospect, we see no reason why one can't reduce the time between rounds.
A whole new field of research and development devoted to designing smart markets for complex commercial transactions has emerged. Other potential application areas, such as markets for natural gas, water consumption, electric power, and financial assets, abound in both the public and private sectors. Bossaerts, Fine, and Ledyard [2002] ; Olson et al. [2000] , and Geoffrion and Krishnan [2000] make the point that the combination of operations research and economics (computation and incentives) is needed for success in complex auction design. This was also our experience. New processes providing better feedback to bidders now exist, and they seem more user friendly and faster than the path-breaking but simple process SLS used [DeMartini et al. 1999] . We believe that the pioneering SLS auction opens the door to constructive applications in other market areas.
APPENDIX: A Stylized Example of Combined Value
A retail company requires different loads on three lanes: from Los Angeles to Chicago five truckloads, from Chicago to New Orleans 7 truckloads, and from New Orleans to Los Angeles 10 truckloads. (See Figure 1) . It could buy or lease 10 trucks and allow a lot of empty back-hauls, but that would be costly. It might find a cheaper solution by outsourcing.
Suppose three trucking firms have the same costs but different customer bases.
Each has a current contract for a lane and has some (usually uncertain) revenue from the return trip (Table 3 ).
Include Table 3 here At any price P such that X < P < C (LA to Chicago), both would gain.
One can continue the analysis. 
The SLS Experimental Setup
The goal in designing the experiments for the SLS auction was to provide a testbed that would exhibit the benefits of combined value in an example that would look familiar to truckers and that would enable us to demonstrate how easy and productive a combinedvalue auction would be. Taking a lane map of the United States with 854 lanes and reducing it to something manageable was the first step. We chose to focus on seven locations and nine lanes. We chose a structure, that would represent most combinedvalue opportunities known to exist (Figure 2 ).
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Include Figure 2 here
To put meat on this structure, we added network loads, one-way times, and costs.
This information was common knowledge, available and known to all (Table 4) .
Include Table 4 here
The carriers private information included other traffic revenue (both its own and possibly 6 revenues for others), units (trucks) at its disposal, and opportunity costs (Table   5 ).
Include Table 5 here Finally, to help the carriers, we calculated the combined value of several packages and reported them as the values of "some packages that you may want to consider" (Table 6 ).
Include Table 6 here
The Simple Mathematics of A Combined Value Auction
In the experiments, a bid was a detailed specification of a package of lanes a firm was willing to service along with the minimal amount of revenue the firm required for that package. (Carriers served lanes in all-or-non fashion.) A bid consisted of four items:
(1) The list of lanes, (2) The minimum amount the firm needed to supply those lanes per week, (3) An estimated utilization of capacity in whole units for each package, and (4) A capacity constraint that specified the total units the carrier would supply across all of its accepted bids
The last two features of a bid allowed each carrier firm to submit more bids than it would actually be able to service, since the algorithm would not accept more bids than the firm could service. These two features were not included in the actual SLS auction.
One can think of a bid for firm j as <{ (x, b, u) For each lane l, there is a reserve price R l . The reserve price can be the price that the shipper could contract for that lane individually. Reserve prices allowed us to structure the optimization so that there were no degeneracies. The reserve price R k of a package k was the sum of the reserve prices of the lanes in that package.
Given a collection of bids, the combined-value-auction algorithm finds d jk to The number of units in your fleet is 8 and the profits/week per unit not used is 10. 
